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Abstract 
This article evaluates the intensity of competition by estimate a bank-specific and time 
varying Lerner Index as a measure of market power by Zambian banks in the post-reform 
period. Using a model of oligopolistic conduct, we show that Zambian banks exercised 
market power in setting prices. Furthermore, market concentration, efficiency performance, 
diversity in revenue sources and regulatory intensity accounted for much of the banks’ 
exercise of market power. However, the results indicate that credit risk and macroeconomic 
uncertainty had a weakening effect on the banks’ exercise of market power. The policy lesson 
from the analysis is that regulatory authorities should continue with the policy of opening up 
the financial sector to more players in order to foster contestability in the banking industry.  
JEL Classifications: C33, D43, G21 
Key Words: Banking, market power, competition 
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Characterising Market Power and its Determinants in the Zambian 
Banking Indudstry 
 
1. Introduction 
The microeconomic theory of the banking firm offers different aspects on the conduct of 
banks and their pricing strategies. In particular, the existence of pure profits which arises 
from exercise of market power depicts the banks’ long-run equilibrium configuration in an 
imperfect market situation. Market power, depicted by the Lerner Index, is measured as a 
relative mark-up of price over marginal cost divided by price (Lerner, 1934). Coccorese 
(2009) argues that the Lerner Index is a true reflection of the banks’ degree of market power 
because it represents the behavioural departure from monopoly and perfect competition. 
Market power is especially prevalent in industries dominated by a few large firms, which 
serve as market leaders through collusive conduct.  
A number of factors can influence banks’ exercise of market power. For instance, 
structural indicators such as concentration ratios could induce changes in the banks’ pricing 
conduct. The nature of regulatory policy and the macroeconomic environment in which banks 
operate could also interact and influence the manner in which banks price and cost their 
products and services. Cost inefficiency also has a significant bearing on the behaviour of 
commercial banks. In the Zambian banking sector, sustained wide interest rate spreads, high 
levels of market concentration coupled with high profit indicators have reinforced the view 
that Zambian banks exercise market power in pricing bank products and services.    
This paper estimates the market power index in the Zambian banking industry and 
analyses its evolution during the post reform period. The study then investigates the factors 
that explain the banks’ exercise of market power by relating the estimated bank-specific 
Lerner indices to structural and non-structural variables. Knowledge of banks’ exercise of 
market power is critical because it provides information on the actual behaviour regarding the 
banks’ influence over price and output in the banking sector. This is of particular importance 
to the regulatory authorities that rely on static measures of competitiveness which ignore the 
evolution of competition in the banking industry.  Banks also need a clear assessment of their 
market position to ensure that they are not the focus of monopoly regulators.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in understanding the nature of 
competition in the Zambian banking industry.  The study utilises a unique bank level data set 
to analyse the banks’ pricing behaviour and appeals to empirically tested methodologies in 
investigating the banks’ actual conduct.  The availability of longitudinal data allows us to 
estimate the Lerner Index using the output price and marginal cost estimated from a cost 
function and also to account for unobservable individual bank differences. From the Sub-
African perspective, the study extends the analysis of Aboagye, et al. (2008) who estimated 
the Lerner index for the Ghanaian banking sector.  In this regard, the study narrows the 
research gap on the measurement of banks’ market power in developing countries and 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where there is a dearth of systematic research on 
the behaviour of banks. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
performance of the Zambian banking industry during the post-reform period, highlights the 
dominance of large and of foreign owned banks. A survey of the literature is presented in 
Section 3, providing evidence that market power is prevalent in banking markets but that 
market concentration is not a key driver of the banks’ exercise of market power. The 
methodology employed is discussed in Section 4, drawing from the influential works of 
Monti and Klein, which underpins models of oligopoly behaviour. Section 5 presents 
empirical results, providing evidence of the existence of market power in Zambian banking 
industry and the importance of structural, macroeconomic and regulatory factors in driving 
the price-cost mark-up. Section 6, which provides concluding remarks, shows the congruence 
in our results to those of previous studies but underscores the importance of strengthening 
policy reforms to deepen competitiveness in the Zambian banking industry.  
 
2. Overview of the Zambian banking sector 
  
Commercial banks in Zambia are the most active players in the financial sector with 
size of assets more than tenfold that of other financial institutions combined. However, the 
amount of credit allocated to the private sector is low, averaging only about 8 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product between 1998 and 2006.  At this level, the level of banks’ private 
sector lending is one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004). On the other 
hand, Zambian banks boast of a relatively similar magnitude of credit to the public sector, 
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mainly accounted for by holdings of Treasury securities. Until recently, bank lending to the 
government was blamed for the observed high cost of credit in the banking industry, which in 
turn has undermined financial intermediation. Demonstrating inefficient allocation of credit, 
this crowding out effect entails that Zambian banks have had a limited impact on the 
economy in terms of credit provision.  
A possible explanation for the ineffectiveness of bank lending to the private sector may 
lie in the structure of the banking industry, which is dominated by a small number of large 
banks, mainly of foreign orientation. Table 1 summarises the structure and size of the 
Zambian banking between 1998 and 2006. The balance sheet composition of Zambian 
commercial banks shows that on aggregate, assets grew substantially over the sample period, 
amounting to K10.7 trillion (US$2.9 billion) at the end of 2006 against only K1.4 trillion 
(US$0.4billion) in 1998.  
Table 1: Structure of the Zambian commercial banking sector, post crisis period            
  
1998 
   
2002 
   
2006 
 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 Number of banks  7 5 1 
 
8 5 1 
 
8 4 1 
 Total assets (K'bn)  900.39 139.07 373.47 
 
3,199.76 443.70 979.16 
 
7,260.49 1,575.26 1,676.72 
 Percent of industry assets  63.73 9.84 26.43 
 
67.73 9.39 20.73 
 
68.01 14.76 15.71 
 Loans (K'bn)  288.94 28.65 142.18 
 
825.85 83.29 65.61 
 
2,739.78 609.33 517.53 
 Percent of industry loans  62.84 6.23 30.92 
 
84.73 8.54 6.73 
 
70.86 15.76 13.38 
Securities (K’bn) 109.75 18.58 26.07 
 
528.27 135.37 383.81 
 
1,354.23 274.54 521.50 
Percent of total industry 
holdings 
71.08 12.03 16.88 
 
50.43 12.92 36.64 
 
62.98 12.77 24.25 
 Deposits (K'bn)  675.49 77.65 240.71 
 
2,139.14 188.21 771.70 
 
5,293.52 1,133.81 1,337.66 
 Percent of industry 
deposits  
67.97 7.81 24.22 
 
69.03 6.07 24.90 
 
68.17 14.60 17.23 
 Source: Bank of Zambia and own calculations           
 
The total share of assets held by local private banks and the public sector bank 
amounted to 30.5 percent of industry assets, representing K3.3 trillion (approximately 
US$0.9 billion) in value.  On the other hand, foreign owned banks have the largest share of 
industry assets, reflecting their dominance in the Zambian banking market. The amount of 
loans held by subsidiaries of foreign banks stood at K2.7 trillion (US$0.7 billion) in 2006, a 
growth of 231 percent over 2002. The increase in loans granted occurred against a backdrop 
of renewed lending by most foreign owned banks, following improvements in 
macroeconomic conditions. Inflation declined to below 10percent for the first time in more 
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than thirty years, largely due to robust economic growth which averaged above 5percent in 
the four year period to 2006. In contrast, domestic private banks and the state-owned bank 
lagged behind, recording total loans worth K1.1 trillion (US$0.3 billion) between them, less 
than half that of foreign owned banks. As a proportion of total industry loans, private 
domestic banks accounted for 15.8 percent and the public sector bank took up 13.4 percent. 
However, relative to 2002, this represented an improvement, although the dominance of 
foreign banks remained evident despite shrinkage in their market share for loans.  
The same pattern obtains on the liability side where foreign owned banks accounted for 
a significant proportion of purchased funds, particularly deposits. The stock of deposits held 
by subsidiaries of foreign banks amounted to K5.3 trillion (US$1.4 billion) in 2006, two 
thirds of the industry’s total deposits. This amount depicted a growth rate of 147.5 percent in 
nominal terms over the 2002 position. Conversely, deposits held by domestic private banks 
amounted to K1.1 trillion (approximately US$0.3 billion) in 2006, a substantial increase over 
the 2002 position. The public sector bank also recorded an increase in the volume of deposits, 
growing from K0.8 trillion (US$0.2 billion) in 2002 to K1.3 trillion (US$0.3 billion) in 2006.   
As argued above, the Zambian banking system is one of the most concentrated in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and this is demonstrated by the three bank concentration ratio ( 3CR ) 
for assets, deposits and loans. Table 2 presents the indicators of market concentration. The 
figures show that the three largest banks accounted for 58 percent of assets, 67 percent of 
loans and 62 percent of deposits.  
Table 2: Concentration in the Zambian commercial banking sector 
Three bank concentration ratios, CR3 (percent):1998-2006 
    Assets 
 
Deposits 
 
Loans 
1998 
 
64.3 
 
67.7 
 
71.2 
1999 
 
66.2 
 
69.3 
 
77.1 
2000 
 
59.4 
 
61.9 
 
71.5 
2001 
 
60.3 
 
62.9 
 
74.0 
2002 
 
59.2 
 
62.4 
 
62.7 
2003 
 
55.8 
 
58.5 
 
60.6 
2004 
 
58.1 
 
61.5 
 
61.6 
2005 
 
55.8 
 
56.7 
 
60.1 
2006   50.4 
 
53.1 
 
59.7 
Average   58.4 
 
61.6 
 
66.5 
Source: BoZ data and author’s own calculations 
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Two of these three banks were subsidiaries of foreign banks and the third was a state 
owned bank, which accounted for more than a fifth in each of the industry assets, deposits 
and loans. The information contained in 3CR  is corroborated by the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index  HHI which also depicted a high level of concentration (Table 3). The observed HHI
for loans far exceeded 1800 often used by regulators to measure the intensity of competition. 
Although the HHI for deposits and total assets was lower than the regulatory threshold, it 
remained higher than 1000, indicating low competitive intensity.  
 Table 3: Banking concentration - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
  
Assets 
 
Deposits 
 
Loans 
 
1998 
 
1683.4 
 
1691.0 
 
2036.7 
 
1999 
 
1729.1 
 
1740.3 
 
2369.0 
 
2000 
 
1453.8 
 
1762.5 
 
2116.3 
 
2001 
 
1537.0 
 
1576.4 
 
2165.4 
 
2002 
 
1491.0 
 
1577.1 
 
1952.3 
 
2003 
 
1399.3 
 
1398.7 
 
1918.0 
 
2004 
 
1459.4 
 
1466.7 
 
1872.3 
 
2005 
 
1418.8 
 
1292.0 
 
1848.9 
 
2006 
 
1267.3 
 
1194.3 
 
1689.1 
 
Average 
 
1493.2 
 
1522.1 
 
1996.4 
 
Source: BoZ data and author’s own calculations 
 
The high level of market concentration partly explains the banks’ high profits. A look at 
two main profitability indicators, namely the return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin 
(NIM), underscores the banks’ high level of profitability. At an average of more than 
20percent, the spread is also considered one of the highest in SSA (IMF and World Bank, 
2002).  
Table 4: Bank profitability measures, by ownership category 
 
Return on assets, ROA (percent) 
 
Net interest margin, NIM (percent) 
 
Foreign Local Public All banks 
 
Foreign Local Public All banks 
1998 4.80 0.85 2.75 3.89 
 
5.47 2.29 0.39 3.86 
1999 7.92 0.47 0.17 5.61 
 
4.53 1.01 1.81 2.97 
2000 9.99 3.12 4.32 8.16 
 
6.72 4.17 1.66 5.74 
2001 7.48 5.93 -7.16 4.70 
 
5.65 4.81 1.82 5.35 
2002 7.15 7.60 6.43 7.05 
 
4.64 5.68 5.29 5.35 
2003 5.65 6.27 0.93 4.76 
 
2.85 5.80 0.09 3.70 
2004 3.14 4.94 1.31 3.02 
 
5.10 7.54 5.01 6.00 
2005 6.52 6.99 3.15 6.00 
 
5.25 7.71 9.15 6.70 
2006 3.98 5.27 1.33 3.68 
 
4.75 4.84 7.18 5.60 
Average 6.29 4.61 1.47 5.21 
 
5.00 4.87 3.60 5.03 
Source: Author’s own calculations from BoZ data 
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 An analysis of profitability by bank ownership structure shows that foreign owned 
banks recorded higher profits than domestic and public sector banks. At an average of 6.3 
percent, foreign banks’ profitability index was 37 percent higher than that for domestic banks 
and was 4.3 times greater than that posted by the public sector banks. A striking feature of the 
banks’ profitability is that foreign owned banks lost their first position to domestic private 
banks between 2002 and 2006, thanks to the latter group’s rationalisation of operational 
costs. Between 2002 and 2006, domestic private banks instituted cost saving measures 
resulting in better profit performance.  
The improvement in profit performance showed that domestic private banks had 
recouped the loss in profitability since the banking crisis in the mid-1990s which had 
dampened their earning opportunities as a result of flight to quality. The performance of the 
state owned bank was adversely affected by a sharp increase in losses, which resulted in 
negative profits in 2001. Nonetheless, profits rebounded strongly in 2002, but this momentum 
was short-lived as profits declined to below 2 percent on average between 2003 and 2006. 
Therefore, the recovery of 2002 did little to offset earlier losses, largely due to a reduction in 
fee income and an appreciation of the domestic currency which substantially eroded foreign 
exchange gains of the earlier years.  
The wide net interest margins and high profitability reflect the oligopolistic nature of the 
Zambian banking market as seen by the dominance of few banks in the industry (World 
Bank, 2004). High margins may also be due to macroeconomic instability and regulatory 
burden. Over the years, Zambian banks have operated under a high inflationary environment 
while the statutory reserve ratio was, until 2007, above 10 percent.  
 
3. Overview of the literature on market power 
Models of oligopoly behaviour have become increasingly popular in analysing bank 
conduct, including market power. These imperfect competition models offer robust 
improvements to the traditional measures of banking conduct such as the SCP and they make 
the analysis more appealing (Toolsema, 2004; Freixas & Rochet, 1997). A theoretical 
framework for analysing bank profit margins has its roots in the seminal works of Klein 
(1971) and Monti (1972).  
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Previous studies of bank oligopolistic behaviour relied on aggregate indicators of 
performance. However, in recent years, the availability of individual firm level data and the 
discontent about the failure of structural models to explain bank behaviour has spurred 
growth in new methodologies of analysing bank performance, known as non-structural 
models of New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) models, couched in panel data 
econometrics.  By analysing firm level mark-ups, one can readily satisfy the assumptions of 
possible price-taking behaviour among individual firms as opposed to previous studies which 
violated this assumption (Hanan & Liang, 1993). The use of bank-level data also provides an 
opportunity to examine the evolution of market power over time and across firms.  
In view of the above, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) analysed the behaviour of Italian 
regional banks using a Lerner Index estimated from a conjectural variations model. The 
authors show that financial deregulation fostered a reduction in price-cost margins. Fernandez 
de Guevara, et al. (2005) estimated the Lerner Index for the European Union (EU) banking 
system. Their estimates of the Lerner Index could not support presence of competitive 
behaviour within the banking markets of the EU member countries. The authors also assessed 
the determinants of market power, using among other variables, a measure of concentration 
in the deposits market, which was found to be insignificant. Instead, bank cost efficiency, 
default risk and bank size were found to be the main explanatory factors. Utilising a similar 
approach, Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2007) estimated the Lerner index for Spanish 
banks. Their conclusion was that market power increased among Spanish banks, driven 
largely by bank size, efficiency and specialisation. However, bank concentration was found 
to be an insignificant variable, corroborating earlier research findings.  
In a study of market power in Swedish banking, Sjöberg (2006) estimated a conduct 
parameter based on the Bresnahan (1982; 1989) oligopoly model. The estimated Lerner Index 
showed that the degree of competition was especially high (lower market power) among large 
banks in Sweden despite high concentration in the sector. Based on the same framework, 
Fischer and Hempell (2006) showed that the Lerner Index for German banks depicted 
increasing competitive pressures with regional structural and economic variables playing an 
important role in sustaining the banks’ exercise of market power. Demand factors were also 
found to have a strong economic effect on market power but the level of concentration was 
insignificant.  
The literature of banks’ exercise of market power and the factors influencing it in 
developing countries is sparse and mainly confined to emerging and transition economies. 
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For sub-Saharan Africa, (SSA) the evidence is especially scanty. The majority of the studies 
infer market power using interest rate spreads, implying that these are good measures of 
market power. The problem with this approach is that market power may be endogenous. For 
instance, interest rate spreads could be affected by banks’ exercise of market power while 
high margins may themselves be a consequence of market power, as demonstrated by Moore 
and Craigwell (2002), Chirwa and Mlachila (2004), among others.  
As a remedy to the above shortcomings, Fahrer and Rohling (1981) argue it is important 
to apply approaches that take into account the direct behaviour of commercial banks in 
estimating market power. The NEIO models fall in this category. These approaches recognise 
the need to endogenise market structure in the banking industry and test the exercise of 
market power without relying on structural measures such as concentration ratios and number 
of firms (Delis, Staikouras, & Varlagas, 2008). Indeed competition can exist even in a 
duopoly market while monopolistic conduct is also possible even in markets with a large 
number of players as Ausunbel (1991) has demonstrated for the U.S. credit card market.   
Only a handful of studies for SSA have used the NEIO methodologies in measuring 
market power more directly. Of special interest is a study by Aboagye, et al. (2008) for 
Ghanaian banks. The authors applied a methodology along the lines of Fernandez de 
Guevara, et al. (2005) to a panel of Ghanaian banks. Their observation was that Ghanaian 
banks possess market power on account of size, efficiency and the macroeconomic 
environment in which they operate. The other study by Okealaham (2007) took a different 
approach to the assessment of market power in the South African banking sector. The author 
argues that banks’ exercise of market power is not a reflection of market imperfections but a 
consequence of cost economies. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the 
efficiency structure hypothesis. This implies that commercial banks enjoying scale economies 
may exercise greater market power thereby dwarfing the effects of structural indicators such 
as concentration ratios.  
Other studies for developing countries include Solis and Maudos (2008), who estimate 
and offer evidence on the social cost of market power using data from the Mexican banking 
sector. The results of this analysis show that Mexican banks exercised substantial market 
power in setting loan interest rates with the consequence that cost efficiency was significantly 
undermined. The estimate of the Lerner Index derived from interest rates showed that in 
2005, social cost of market power was 0.15 percent of GDP. However, no evidence of the 
‘quiet life’ hypothesis was found for the deposits market.  
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Tovar, et al. (2007) analysed the interplay between risk, concentration and market 
power in the Colombian banking industry after the regulatory reforms. Their results show that 
subsequent to the reforms, Colombian banks exhibited high systemic risk, which served as a 
collusive device and the cost of this risk was borne by bank customers through high mark-
ups. However, the authors failed to find evidence of market concentration as a significant 
collusive factor. Rather, its effect on market power was only robust after controlling for 
systemic risk.  
 
4. Methodological framework 
 
4.1 Analytical Framework  
 
The analytical framework for estimation of market power in the Zambian banking 
industry borrows from the influential Klein-Monti theoretical oligopolistic model.  
In order to simplify the Klein-Monti framework, we use a special case of duopoly in 
line with Dvořák (2005). Let the cost function be denoted by  i D i L iTC D,L = γ D +γ L , i = 1,2  
where TC , represents total operating costs, D and L  denote total deposits and loans while 
Dγ  and Lγ  are marginal costs of producing them, respectively. The loan rate  Lr , deposit rate
 Dr , and the money market rate  r are exogenously determined assuming banks compete in 
quantity, . Therefore, each bank faces a downward sloping demand curve for loans and an 
upward supply curve for deposits, given by  LL r  and  DD r , respectively. The loan and 
deposit rates are inverse functions of the demand for loans and supply of deposits, as depicted 
by  LrL  and  DrD , respectively. Finally, the cash statutory reserves denoted by R , are given 
by  R= 1- D - L where  is a fraction of deposits held as cash reserves at the central bank. 
Taking the amount of loans and deposits chosen by other banks as given, each bank 
maximises its profit according to the following specification  
 
         i L 1 2 i D 1 2 i D i L i= r L +L - r L + r 1- - r D +D D - γ D +γ L      
  
(1) 
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where, i is bank i ’s profits, 1 2L ,L are the amount of loans granted by bank 1 and 2 whereas 
1 2D ,D are the amounts of deposits received by bank 1 and 2, respectively. Equation (1) shows 
that a bank’s profit can be expressed as the difference between intermediation margins and 
operating expenses. The first order conditions for loans and deposits are derived as follows 
 
   
  * *
*
' * *
L L L
*
'
D D D
π L
= r L +r L - r - γ = 0  
L 2
π D
= r 1- - r D - r D - γ = 0
D 2
       
   
 
 
  


i
i
i
i
   (2) 
 
L  and D are solutions to the bank’s objective function denoting equilibrium amounts of 
loans and deposits for the banking sector. Rewriting the first order condition for loans  in 
elasticity form yields the Lerner Index  LI  given by  
 
 
 
*
L L
* *
L L L
r - r +γ 1
LI = =
r 2ε r
     (3) 
 
where Lε  denotes the elasticity of demand for loans and LI  is the Lerner Index defined 
above.  The Lerner Index for deposits can be derived analogously. Under the N - firms case, 
the demand elasticities would be scaled by a factor of N , the total number of banks in the 
industry.  
 
4.2 Empirical model and estimation strategy  
The empirical model is adapted from Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005). Other 
empirical studies in this genre of models include Corvoisier & Gropp (2002) and Gropp, et al. 
(2007). Other variants of imperfect competition models are based on the conjectural 
variations approach following Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1989) and Lau (1982). 
Applications of this group of models have included Shaffer (1993; 2001), Angelini and 
Cetorelli (2003) and Kubo (2006), among others.  
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In this empirical formulation, the estimation of the Lerner Index requires knowledge of 
the price of banking output such as actual interest rates charged on loans. However, for the 
banking industry in general and the Zambian banking sector in particular, the data on loan 
interest rates are not readily available. Since the flow of banking services is proportional to its 
stock of assets, the price of bank output can be approximated by the ratio of total revenue 
(interest and non-interest income) to total assets. Averaging across all banks yields an 
average market price. This output price construct   ensures that both on-balance sheet outputs 
and off-balance sheet asset items are captured in order to avoid understating bank production 
(Jagtiani & Khanthavit, 1996). It is therefore consistent with overall bank behaviour.  
The profit and loss statements do not also report marginal costs related to the production 
of any of the individual asset items for Zambian banks. Therefore, an approximate measure of 
marginal cost has to be estimated. Given that marginal cost is not directly observable, it has 
to be estimated from a translog cost function. In industrial countries and other developed 
emerging markets where interbank trading accounts for a large volume of sources of funds 
for commercial banks, the interbank interest rate has been used as a proxy for marginal cost 
of production.  
However, in less developed countries characterised by rudimentary financial markets, 
the main source of banks’ funds is bank deposits. In Zambia, the amount of funds raised 
through the overnight interbank market represents only 1.8 percent of total liabilities while 
deposits account for 78.2 percent. While recognising that banks are multioutput firms, we 
aggregate all bank outputs, namely loans, securities, and other assets into an aggregate 
measure of bank product (total assets) which enables us to construct a single measure of 
marginal cost for overall production activity. If costs were reported for individual bank 
products and markets, we would then calculate output-specific marginal costs as Berg and 
Kim (1998) did for retail and corporate submarkets. Thus, the translog cost function used for 
estimating marginal cost is given by 
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where, itTC  denotes total operating costs, jitw represents factor input prices, itY is total output,
j denote actual inputs,  is an error term. The estimation of the cost function also includes 
control variables. The variable BRANCH is the number of branches operated by commercial 
banks. It controls for the scale of operation and effect of branch network density on costs.
1
 By 
including BRANCH in the cost function, we postulate that the banks’ production technology 
differs in a significant way due to variations in size and other unmeasured factors associated 
with maintaining the bank branches. The variable RISK is the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans. Non-performing loans (NPLs) are treated as banks’ undesirable outputs or costs 
which decrease banks’ performance. The risk variable captures the impact of poor output 
quality on bank costs. Finally, INTERMED  is the intermediation ratio defined as the ratio of 
loans-to-deposits. The flow of deposits into the banking sector determines the amount of 
loans a bank can make in a given period. Furthermore, banks that rely more on deposits to 
finance assets face a higher funding risk than those that hold a relatively higher proportion of 
equity capital. Therefore, this variable is included to measure the effect of deposit fund 
utilisation in financial intermediation. In line with standard literature, we also impose 
symmetry and homogeneity conditions on the cost function above.  
The cost function depicted by Equation (4) can be estimated directly using ordinary 
least squares in a panel data context. However, there are efficiency gains when it is estimated 
jointly with input cost share equations. The inclusion of the cost share equations in the 
estimation procedure has an advantage of creating more degrees of freedom without adding 
any unrestricted regression coefficients. It also yields more asymptotically efficient parameter 
estimates than would otherwise be if the cost function is estimated on its own. Input share 
                                                          
1
 In some studies, the log of assets is used to capture bank size. However, this may introduce problems of 
multicollinearity given  that output is also measured by total assets.  
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equations for labour, funds or capital are calculated by partially differentiating the cost 
function with respect to Lw , Fw  and Kw , the variables depicting labour, funds and capital 
inputs, respectively Input share equations for these three inputs are given below:  
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(5) 
  
 
where jS  is input specific share such that 1L K FS S S   and j is a random error term for 
the thj input  , ,j L K F .  
Since the input shares sum to unity, one of the factor share equations is dropped to 
obtain a non-singular covariance matrix. Therefore, only 1J  share equations are estimated 
jointly with the cost function. The resulting parameter estimates are asymptotically equivalent 
to those obtained by the maximum likelihood approach and are invariant to the factor share 
equation dropped during estimation. The joint estimation of the cost function and the 1J 
input cost share equations is estimated by applying Zellner’s (1962) two-step iterated 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation (ISURE) procedure. The cost function is 
normalised by the input price of funds, leaving us with two share equations for labour  LS
and capital  KS , respectively.  
Partially differentiating Equation (4) with respect to ln itY   yields a measure of marginal 
cost according to Equation (6)   
 
,
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where itmc is the bank level marginal cost. The industry wide marginal cost  MC is obtained 
by
1
N
i
i
MC mc N

  where N  is the number of decision making units, herein called banks. 
Consistent with Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005), the bank specific Lerner Index measure 
of market power is given by 
 
it it
it
it
p - mc
LI =
p
      (7) 
 
where, ip  denotes output price for each bank, proxied by the ratio of total revenue to total 
assets in each period. Equation (8) depicts the average Lerner Index for the banking industry 
  
P - MC
LI =
P
t t
t
t
      (8) 
where P captures the market price for the whole banking industry, calculated by as 
1
N
i
i
P p N

 . 
 
4.3 Evolution of market power and its determinants  
A major advantage of the approach adopted in estimating the Lerner Index is that it 
gives a better understanding of the evolution of competition over time. In this way, we can 
then relate the market power index to its explanatory factors. These factors could be bank-
specific, structural, regulatory or macroeconomic in nature. Firstly, we control for the 
structure of the market in which banks operate, depicted by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
 HHI  derived from gross loans.2 The theoretical rationale for including a measure of 
market structure is that an individual bank exerts greater influence over the market price 
                                                          
2
 As a robustness check, alternative measures of market structure were introduced. Specifically, the HHI based 
on total assets and deposits and four-firm concentartion ratio were used in place of the loans based HHI. 
Estimation with the alternative definitions of HHI produced insignificant and/or wrong signs for coefficients 
while using the four-firm concentration ratio led to significant loss of observations. Therefore we retained the 
loans based HHI in the regression.     
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relative to marginal cost, thereby increasing the mark-up (Beighley & McCall, 1975; Cowling 
& Waterson, 1976). This impact is greater the more dominant the bank is and how other 
banks respond to this dominance. Results of previous research notwithstanding, we 
conjecture that HHI has a positive effect on the Lerner Index. 
The second variable we consider is bank credit risk  RISK , defined earlier. Banks’ 
exposure to high credit risk could manifest itself in deterioration of the credit portfolio. To 
avoid incurring risk, banks may pre-screen their customers and choose to lend to less risky 
borrowers, even at high interest rates (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Commercial banks may also 
increase the proportion of risk free assets such as Treasury securities thereby reducing risk-
premiums (Tovar, Jaramillo, & Hernandez, 2007). When banks opt to increase their risk 
exposure, the price-cost margins tend to be higher as banks cover up for the potential loss in 
revenue arising from default risk by raising their prices relative to marginal cost. However, 
when the proportion of bad loans is lower, margins tend to decrease, suggesting weaker 
market power. Therefore, the effect of the credit risk variable on the Lerner Index is expected 
to be positive.   
We also consider the effect of regulatory intensity on banks’ exercise of market power. 
Since the banks’ core business involves risk lending, minimum capital requirements are 
imposed to ensure that banks possess sufficient capital to cover liabilities in an event of bank 
failure. However, higher regulatory capital requirements could potentially harm bank 
competitiveness by increasing market power. Thus, to capture the impact of regulatory 
burden on market power, we include the capital adequacy ratio  CAPRATIO . Banks facing 
tighter regulatory burden are expected to raise margins in order to build up a sufficient 
revenue buffer necessary for maintaining solvency. Thus, a positive sign is expected on
CAPRATIO . 
Cost inefficiency in banking is often associated with high mark-ups because banks tend 
to mask their operating inefficiency through wide spreads, the cost of which is borne by 
customers. Some authors interpret existence of wide mark-ups as evidence of cost 
inefficiency in the banking sector (Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, & Faust, 2007). When cost 
inefficiency is a binding constraint, this leads to high market power and may be exacerbated 
by agency problems. However, it is also possible that banks’ high price-cost margins could 
move in tandem with better cost efficiency performance, mainly because efficient banks are 
able to contain costs and therefore post wide mark-ups as predicted by the efficiency-
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structure hypothesis. For these reasons, the relationship between cost efficiency and mark-ups 
is unclear.  
Another important performance indicator for Zambian banks is the proportion of other 
income to total assets  OITASS . Banks with better non-interest revenue performance would 
exert greater market power, and may use this as an entry barrier. A positive coefficient is 
therefore expected on the variableOITASS . We also control for the ratio of interbank 
deposits to total customer and short-term funds  DEPMIX to account for diversity of bank 
funding on banks’ exercise of market power. We conjecture that banks with a high proportion 
of interbank deposits relative to total deposits will have a low mark-up, depicting lower 
market power.  
Price-cost margins could also vary with macroeconomic conditions and the monetary 
policy rule. For instance, during a recession, mark-ups tend to decrease and increase in boom 
times. Small (1998) found that mark-ups in the financial services sector in the United 
Kingdom were procyclical. However, Carbo´ et al. (2003) argue that buoyant economic 
growth and a stable macroeconomic environment tend to negatively affect prices and costs, 
although the extent to which these variables are influenced may be significantly different. 
Other studies see for instance Toolsema (2004) suggests that procyclical monetary policy 
affects the Lerner Index in a countercyclical manner, indicating that there is an inverse 
relationship between monetary conditions and market power. We include the rate of inflation 
 INFLATION as an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty and hypothesise a positive 
coefficient.
3
 This suggests that a high rate of inflation induces banks to increase prices of 
bank products whilst cutting down on operating costs to remain competitive. We also include 
the 91-day Treasury bill rate  TBR to capture effects of monetary policy stance given that 
the central bank uses auctions of Treasury securities to raise funds for the government and 
also as a monetary policy tool for mopping up excess liquidity from the banking system. 
Therefore, a positive coefficient is expected onTBR .  
In view of the foregoing, we estimated Equation (9) below to assess the determinants of 
market power in the Zambian banking industry 
                                                          
3
 In Zambia, the exchange rate is also widely viewed as an important signal of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
However, its inclusion in the regression yielded poor results, see discussion below. Therefore, we posit that 
given the strong passthrough effects, see for instance, Mutoti (2006) (2006) (2006) the rate of inflation 
adequately captures movements in the exchange rate.    
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The variables in Equation (9) are respectively, Lerner Index  LI , Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index  HHI , a measure of macroeconomic policy stance  INFLATION , monetary policy 
stance  TBR bank credit risk  RISK , cost efficiency index  EFF , regulatory capital 
intensity  CAPRATIO , 
 
a measure of deposit mix  DEPMIX , a revenue scaling factor 
 OITASS . Finally, ν denotes a random error term and as before, i denotes observation per 
bank while t is the time of observation in quarters.   
 
 
5. Sample, data and estimation results 
 
9.1 Sample and data  
The sample covers all commercial banks that were present at the end of each period 
from 1998 to 2006. We employ unique quarterly data gleaned from monthly balance sheet 
and income statement returns submitted by each individual bank to the supervisory 
department of the central bank. During the observation period, one merger took place. Prior 
to the merger, the two merged banks are treated as two separate sample units, in post merger 
period; the absorbed banks are dropped from the data base which means the merged bank 
enters the sample as a single bank. Therefore, due to entry and mergers, the sample is an 
unbalanced panel of 388 observations. Table 5 gives variable definitions and summary of 
descriptive statistics.  
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Table 5: Variables used in estimating cost efficiency and determinants of market power 
Variable Symbol Variable Name Description and measurement Mean Median Std Dev. 
TC  Total costs Interest expenses plus operating costs  52,200.45 54,027.88 20,222.87 
Y  Bank output Stock of total assets  329,127.70 137,957.00 402,073.50 
Lw  Unit price of labour Total personnel expenses expressed as a proportion of total assets  0.005 0.004 0.004 
Fw  Unit price of funds 
Total interest expenses on deposits and other borrowed funds divided by total deposits and 
borrowed funds 
0.01 0.01 0.12 
Kw  Unit price of physical capital 
Sum of all other expenses (on building, equipment, furniture, etc.) divided by stock of fixed 
and other assets 
0.11 0.05 0.41 
BRANCH  Branches Total number of bank branches operated by an individual bank per given period 11 7 13 
RISK  Portfolio credit risk Non-performing loans expressed as a proportion of total loans 0.09 0.07 0.11 
INTERMED  Intermediation  ratio  Proportion of total loans to total deposits (Loan-to-deposit ratio) 12.239 0.41 35.48 
CONTASS  Asset concentration ratio Proportion of total government securities to total loans (proxy for disintermediation) 2.75 0.84 8.41 
INFLATION  Inflation rate Changes in consumer price index (CPI), percent per annum, expressed on a quarterly basis 20.87 20.60 5.85 
TBR  Treasury bill rate Yield rate on 91-day Treasury bill paper (percent per annum) expressed on a quarterly basis 27.30 32.40 12.51 
OPPCOST  Opportunity cost of cash statutory reserves Interest foregone on cash reserve requirements expressed as a proportion of interest expenses  695.9 213.6 1065.4 
EFF  Cost efficiency Bank-specific cost efficiency score 0.90 1.00 1.00 
DEPMIX  Deposit mix Share of interbank deposits in total deposits 0.23 0.04 3.34 
OITASS
 
Other income Non-interest income as proportion of total assets 0.008 0.007 0.007 
ip  Price of bank output  Total individual bank revenue/total bank assets Total revenue 0.02 0.02 0.01 
P  Market Price of output Average of all bank-level output prices 0.02 0.02 0.001 
MC  Bank-specific  marginal cost Estimated from the translog cost function 0.01 0.010 0.003 
LI
i  Bank-specific Lerner Index Bank-specific Lerner Index of market power 0.50 0.53 0.021 
LI  Industry- average Lerner Index Industry average Lerner Index of market power 0.50 0.51 0.14 
HHIi  Hirschman-Hirfindahl index Market structure concentration index 1970.8 2000.9 182.6 
CAPRATIO  Regulatory capital adequacy ratio Banks’ total capital (Tier I and Tier II capital) as a proportion of risk-weighted assets 0.427 0.300 0.448 
OWNERSHIP  Ownership dummy  
Dummy variable for bank ownership structure (1 for foreign and domestic private banks, zero 
for public banks) 
   
Note: Total costs and bank output (assets) are measured in millions of current Zambian Kwacha (K’million).     
To calculated interest foregone, the risk free 91-day Treasury bill rate is applied to total cash reserves on the assumption that under a regime of zero reserve requirements, banks would invest their funds in less risk 
assets for a guaranteed income stream. Of course, banks can also invest any freed resources in other assets, including foreign exchange deposits abroad and loans. However, these assets are subject to intertemporal 
uncertainty during the period of investment. Securities are less prone to uncertainty. 
Source: Bank of Zambia (BoZ) and author’s own computations 
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9.2 Empirical Results of market power 
Empirical results obtained through joint estimation of equations (4) and (5) pass 
diagnostic tests and coefficients for variables of interest are statistically significant and carry 
expected signs. Empirical results of the ISURE estimation procedure are presented in Table 
6. Using these results, we calculate the bank-specific marginal cost as given in equation (6). 
The marginal cost was then used in conjunction with the approximate measure of output price 
to estimate the bank specific and time variant Lerner Index  iLI . Averaging across all banks 
yields the industry level Lerner Index  LI .  
 
Table 6: Iterated cost function estimation results 
  Coefficient  Parameter 
 
Standard error 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept  0   4.419  
0.718 
 
6.151 
 
0.000*** 
ln(wL)  1   0.074  
0.238 
 
0.311 
 
0.756 
ln(wK)  3   1.069  
0.241 
 
4.439 
 
0.000*** 
ln(Y)  y   0.312  
0.140 
 
2.236 
 
0.025** 
1/2 (ln(Y))2  yy   0.052  
0.014 
 
3.662 
 
0.000*** 
1/2 (ln(wL)
2  1   0.063  
0.035 
 
1.783 
 
0.075* 
1/2 (ln(wK))
2  3   0.017  
0.037 
 
0.463 
 
0.643 
ln(wL)ln(wK)  13   -0.057  
0.032 
 
1.779 
 
0.075* 
ln(wL)ln(Y)  1y   -0.011  
0.016 
 
-0.699 
 
0.484 
ln(wK)ln(Y)  3y   0.037  
0.015 
 
2.479 
 
0.013*** 
t   t  
 -0.005 
 
0.011 
 
-0.450 
 
0.653 
2t   tt  
 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.309 
 
0.758 
t ln(Y)  ty  
 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
1.154 
 
0.248 
t ln(wL)  tL  
 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
1.136 
 
0.256 
t ln(wK)  tK  
 -0.004 
 
0.002 
 
-2.748 
 
0.006*** 
Control Variables  
 
 
       
ln(BRANCH)  1   0.042  
0.012 
 
3.449 
 
0.001*** 
ln(RISK)  2   0.012  
0.008 
 
1.606 
 
0.108 
ln(INTERMED)  3   0.030  
0.010 
 
2.926 
 
0.003*** 
Diagnostics  
 
 
       
Equation  
 
Obs. Parameters 
 
RMSE 
 
2R  
 
p-value 
Cost Function  
 
388 17 
 
0.146 
 
0.995 
 0.000*** 
Labour input share   
 
388 3 
 
1083.940 
 
0.698 
 0.000*** 
Capital input share  
 
388 3 
 
141.579 
 
0.405 
 0.000*** 
 Significance level:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
 Source: Author's own computations based on BoZ data 
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5.2.1 Characteristising the Lerner Index and its evolution 
The evolution of industry output price, marginal cost and the resulting Lerner Index are 
given in Figure 1. Panel (a) of Figure 1 indicates a general decline in output price throughout 
the study period, except for a small spike in early 2005. From 2005, bank output price was 
relatively stable, more or less consistent with developments in the banking sector. In April 
2005, Zambia attained the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative completion 
point, resulting in debt forgiveness which helped improve the country’s macroeconomic 
outlook and credit standing. Improvement in macroeconomic conditions spurred a reduction 
yields rates on Treasury securities and bank loans, although bank lending interest rates fell 
only marginally.  
 
Figure 1: Output price, marginal cost and the Lerner Index (industry average) 
                    
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
           
    
 
    
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Source: Author’s own computations from BoZ data 
 
Despite this, aggregate bank interest revenue decreased. Non-interest income also 
decreased, mainly because of the appreciation in the exchange rate arising from capital 
inflows and market confidence. The appreciation in the exchange rate led to a diminution of 
foreign exchange gains and as a result non-interest income decreased. Prior to the HIPC 
initiative, banks’ income attributed to foreign exchange transactions was more than a quarter 
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(d) Lerner Index by bank ownership
Foreign Domestic State
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of total bank revenue, shored up by a rapidly depreciating currency. However, this share 
contracted to less than one fifth from 2005 onwards. Other categories of non-interest income 
were less affected but their share was overshadowed by reductions in major revenue 
components.   
The movement in marginal cost (Panel b) mimicked that of bank output price, 
underpinning the banks’ realisation of cost containment in a quest to realign their cost 
structure with shrinking revenues from both traditional and non-traditional sources. The 
reduction in marginal cost accelerated from around 2003 and persisted through to 2006, 
reflecting a decrease in operating and financial costs. The net effect of the decrease in the 
price of bank output and marginal cost does not necessarily translate into a lower price-cost 
mark-up. Rather, it depends on which one falls faster.  
Over the sample period, the fall in output price was less rapid relative to the decline in 
marginal cost.  As a result, the Lerner Index assumed an upward trend for most part of the 
sample period (see, Panel (c)). For the full sample, the average Lerner Index was estimated as 
50.9 percent, indicating that banks priced above marginal cost by more than 50.0 percent. 
Across the sample, there are two distinct episodes in the movement of the price-cost margin. 
The average mark-up decreased from 52.6 percent between 1998 and 2001 to 49.6 percent for 
the period between 2002 and 2004. Although it bottomed out slightly between 2005 and 
2006, it remained below the pre-2002 level, averaging 49.4 percent over the last two years of 
the study period.  
The above analysis shows that between 1998 and 2001, Zambian banks enjoyed greater 
latitude in setting prices, which helped them maintain significant market power. During this 
period, the Lerner Index was therefore largely driven more by the high price of bank products 
and services than by falling costs. On the other hand, from 2002 onwards, the banks’ 
marginal costs decreased precipitously mainly due to a fall in deposit interest rates. 
Concurrently, the price of output also decreased, as banks’ lending rates declined in line with 
falling yield rates on Treasury securities. Consequently, the Lerner Index declined marginally 
over this period, implying a slight decrease in market power. 
The estimates of market power suggest that Zambian banks operate in an imperfectly 
competitive environment defined by oligopolistic conduct. This behaviour may be due to risk 
aversion or inadequate predatory strategies that prevent a majority of banks from engaging in 
intense competition. This finding is more compelling for state banks (see Panel (d)) which, 
for reasons of poor credit risk screening mechanisms which resulted in high proportion of bad 
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loans, shied away from engaging in further risky lending. Instead, and supported by soft 
budgets to cushion them from asset deterioration, they accumulated risk-free securities to 
boost their revenue base. This is evidenced by the relatively higher Lerner Index for this 
group of banks compared with other bank categories. The greater exercise of market power 
by public sector banks was a manifestation of incentives created by soft budgets which 
created an uneven competition platform with other banks.  
As these guarantees were eased in preparation for bank privatisation, the Lerner Index 
declined steeply from about 2004, even to the point of converging with mark-up estimates for 
other bank categories. Taking the Lerner Index as an indicator of bank competitiveness, the 
evidence given by Figure 6(d) shows that competition among private and foreign banks may 
have been tighter while public sector banks operated as a monopoly mainly due to state 
incentives and implicit guarantees.  
 
5.2.2 Market structure and other determinants of market power 
In order to explore the determinants of market power by Zambian banks, we exploit the 
rich data set and relate the bank level Lerner Index it indicators of market structure, 
regulatory and macroeconomic variables and bank-specific factors. Regression results are 
summarised in Table 2. The regression equation for the determinants of market power was 
estimated using fixed effects in the context of a static panel, which does not assume 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. On the  other hand is the  error term is suspected to 
be correlated with any of the explanatory variables, the system GMM estimation procedure 
will be the appropriate technique, in which case the lagged Lerner Index could be used as an 
instrument. To control for potential heteroscedasticity, the estimation was conducted using 
robust standard errors in line with Hoechle (2007) and Green (2003).  
The Wald-statistic for model adequacy is statistically significant at 1 percent. However, 
the independent variables explain only 18 percent of the Lerner Index. Given the nature of 
our sample, this appears rather low. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for most panel data 
estimations and cannot be used to authenticate the research findings. Instead, the significance 
of individual coefficients is more informative in making a case for the usefulness and 
robustness of the results as provided in Table 2.  
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The results are indicative of the strong effect of market structure index on market 
power. This is depicted by the positive and highly significant coefficient on the Herfindahl 
Hirschman index  HHI , suggesting that market structure is an important factor in explaining 
banks’ market power. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions and renders 
support to the hypothesis that firms operating in concentrated markets tend to exercise market 
power.  
 
Table 7: Determinants of market power in Zambian banking sector 
 
Coefficient Parameter t-statistic p-value 
     
Intercept 0  -6.166 -2.348 0.019** 
ln  HHI  1  0.869 2.332 0.020** 
ln  EFF  2  0.585 2.385 0.018** 
ln  CAPRATIO  3  0.130 2.011 0.045** 
ln  RISK  4  -0.041 -1.824 0.069* 
ln  OITASS  5  0.216 4.184 0.000*** 
ln  DEPMIX  6  -0.055 -2.117 0.035** 
ln  INFLATION   7  -0.232 -3.040 0.003*** 
ln  TBR  8  0.164 3.633 0.000*** 
     σu   
0.331 
  
σ   
0.366 
  
  
 
0.449 
  
No. of Obs. 
 
359 
  
 
Wald  2χ 8  10.730   
p-value 0.000*** 
  
2
R  0.180   
Hausman test 27.390 
  
p-value 0.000*** 
  
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on BoZ data 
 
The effect of a measure of cost efficiency  EFF  is also robust and of the expected 
positive sign. This result deserves special mention in light of the ambiguity in the market 
power-efficiency relationship discussed earlier. The intuition behind this result is that 
conceptually, cost efficient banks have the ability to exert market power in the Zambian 
banking sector as propagated by proponents of the efficiency structure hypothesis (ESH). 
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Indeed, banks that better manage their productive resources are also able to achieve 
significant market shares and strategically reposition themselves by posting profits generated 
from high mark-ups.  
The credit risk variable  RISK has a negative but weakly significant and small 
coefficient. At first glance this finding appears counterintuitive. However, it must be 
interpreted as follows. Due to historically high proportion of bad loans, Zambian banks have 
shied away from extending credit to a majority of Zambians, thereby shutting them out of the 
credit market. Instead, commercial banks have opted for much safer Treasury securities or 
accumulation of excess reserves (Oxford Policy Management, 2007). In view of this, the risk 
of default is much less, which means that the weight attached to the risk variable in driving 
market power is smaller. When banks have extended credit to the private sector, a majority of 
these banks (largely foreign owned) have employed robust screening techniques before loan 
disbursement. As a result, the ratio of NPLs to gross loans is smaller for this category of 
banks relative to say, public sector banks.
4
 By pre-screening their customers, foreign owned 
banks are able to trade low risk for a small amount of rent. Therefore, the negative parameter 
estimate on the risk variable must be viewed in the context of the high level of risk aversion 
which characterises the Zambian banking sector.  
As expected, the effect of regulatory capital  CAPRATIO is positive and statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. This means that well capitalised banks tend to exercise greater 
market power by virtue of their strength and reputation which manifests itself in capturing a 
large market share as these banks are deemed safer. In the context of the capital buffer theory, 
this result highlights the fact that banks build up capital to hedge against possible 
insolvency.
5
  
Controlling for diversity in revenue sources, the study shows that banks with a greater 
proportion of other income (fees, commissions, foreign exchange gains, etc.) use this as a 
                                                          
4
 From the available data, of the three categories of banks, namely foreign owned, domestic private and public 
owned banks, the latter had the highest proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) relative to gross loans. At an 
average of 34 percent of gross loans, NPLs for public banks was double that for domestic private banks (18 
percent) because this group of banks was not strict in screening loan applicants. Therefore, public owned banks 
tended to load the risk of default and other charges on the loan rate, thereby intensifyng the degree of market 
power. Recall that soft budget guarantees also played a significant part in perpetuating exercise of market power 
by state owned banks. On the other hand, foreign owned banks which boast of better screening techniques had 
the lowest proportion of NPLs of only 6.8 percent. Therefore, it is clear to see that conservative lending, 
especially by subsidiaries of foreign banks, resulted in a much lower estimate of market power as Panel (d) of 
Figure Figure 11 illustrates. 
5
 It is worth noting that the relationship between capital requirements and bank stability is a subject of ongoing 
debate, with no conclusive evidence on the direction of causality (Rochet, 1992).  
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device for perpetuating market power. The estimated parameter on OITASS is positive and 
significant at 1 percent level. Therefore, we submit that including a measure of non-interest 
revenue in the market power regression helps address the important role other sources of 
income play in the Zambian banking sector. The same can be said about the effect of theTBR
on the Lerner Index. Since Zambian banks have historically enjoyed buoyant revenues from 
investing in Treasury securities, this is captured by the coefficient on theTBR , which is 
positive and statistically significant.   
The negative coefficient on the inflation variable  INFLATION
 
indicates that banks 
operating under conditions of macroeconomic uncertainty tend to enjoy relatively less market 
power.
6
 The main prediction from this analysis is that ceteris paribus, bringing down the rate 
of inflation and an improvement in the broad macroeconomic environment can create 
incentives for increased market power in the Zambian banking industry. Comparatively, 
Aboagye, et al. (2008) also found a negative impact of inflation on market power for 
Ghanaian banks.  
The impact of deposit mix  DEPMIX on the Lerner Index was found to be negative and 
significant. This result shows that banks with easy recourse to interbank funds suffered a 
reduction in the relative mark-up. For such banks, short-term interbank borrowing constitutes 
a fundamental source of funding and raises the marginal cost of short-term funds, which 
feeds into a lower mark-up. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence on an important subject of banks’ conduct in terms of 
pricing and cost decisions. The choice of methodological approach and the sample period 
allowed for estimating the bank-specific and time varying Lerner Index. This is important in 
assessing evolution and intensity of competition in the Zambian banking industry. Empirical 
results show that the average Lerner Index for the full sample was 50.9 percent, indicating 
that banks priced above marginal cost by more than 50.0 percent, indicating departure from 
both monopoly behaviour and perfect competition. Results also show that the Lerner Index 
                                                          
6
 An alternative predictor of macroeconomic conditions would be the gross domestic product (GDP). However, 
quarterly GDP data for Zambia are unavailable. Therefore, overall macroeconomic stance is proxied by the 
inflation rate on the premise that macroeconomic uncertainty is inimical to economic growth and therefore high 
inflation would reasonably approximate deterioration in economic conditions.  
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increased steadily from 1998 until 2001 after which it tapered off, suggesting a reduction in 
exercise of market power by Zambian banks.  
The findings also indicate that state banks operated as a monopoly, mainly due to soft 
budgets, which sustained their market power by keeping costs artificially low. The easing of 
implicit guarantees and other operating incentives levelled the playing field somewhat, 
thereby narrowing the divergence in the price-cost mark-up between public sector banks and 
other bank subgroups. The estimates also reveal that domestic private and foreign owned 
banks exhibited similar degree of market power with the Lerner Index within range of the 
sample average. The paper established that bank-specific, structural and macroeconomic 
factors were all important in explaining banks’ exercise of market power during the post 
reform period in the Zambian banking industry. Broadly, the results are in line with previous 
research, which suggests that banking competition in developing and emerging economies is 
low. However, relative to previous studies, our estimate of the Lerner Index suggests that 
Zambian banks exercised greater market power than banks in other countries. It is also worth 
noting that unlike previous research, the level of concentration was found to reinforce banks’ 
exercise of market power, indicating that market dominance was influential in the banks’ 
pricing behaviour. 
Although the results suggest that banks’ conduct was not characteristic of monopolistic 
behaviour, they also indicate a lower level of competitiveness in the Zambian banking 
system. Therefore, there is room for exploiting possibilities of strengthening the degree of 
competition in order to diminish the banks’ exercise of market power. Thus, regulatory 
authorities should design measures aimed at creating further incentives for enhancing 
competitiveness in the banking sector. In particular, the regulatory authorities should 
endeavour to create an enabling environment for contestability in the banking industry, for 
example continuing with the open policy of allowing foreign as well as domestic bank entry 
into the sector. This will intensify competition and propagate efficiency gains across the 
banking market.  
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